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Mercenaries have played an important role in warfare through-
out most of Western history. From the Teutonic tribesmen who
served in Roman legions to the Hessian and Hanoverian soldiers who
fought under the British flag in the American Revolutionary War,
mercenaries have played an integral role in many armies.' In the
period before the French Revolution many governments routinely
hired non-national professionals. Experienced professional officers
commanded a high price for their services. Mercenaries formed the
reliable core of many armies because conscripts and other recruits,
out of necessity, came from otherwise non-productive echelons of the
country's population.2
The rise of nationalism and the citizen-soldier has caused the
large scale use of mercenaries to decline. Yet the activities of soldiers
of fortune have nevertheless surfaced as an issue of international con-
cern. This has been due primarily to the continuing participation of
mercenaries in internal armed conflicts in Africa and elsewhere.' In
describing the perspective of many black African States, Burchett
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cited as Hearings]; W. BURCHETr & D. ROEBUCK, THE WHORES OF WAR: MERCENARIES
TODAY (1977); A. MOCKLER, THE MERCENARIES (1969); S-J.CLARKE, THE CONGO MERCE-
NARY (1968); Burmester, The Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries in Armed Conflicts, 72 AM.
J. INT'L L. 37 (1978); Gerassi, The French Foreign Legion, 5 GEO 42 (1983); Note, Leashing
the Dogs of War: Outlawing the Recruitment and Use of Mercenaries, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 589
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Leashing the Dogs of War]; Note, The Laws of War and the Angolan
Trial of Mercenaries: Death to the Dogs of War, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 323 (1977) [herein-
after cited as The Laws of War].
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and Roebuck remark that "They (mercenaries) were neo-colonial-
ism's last card. . .a faceless and bottomless reserve of cannon fodder,
not identifiable with governments and their policies, immune to pub-
lic criticism and debate. The perfect substitute for the expeditionary
force."4 This reaction seems to derive more from a perception of the
mercenary as a symbol of racism and colonial domination than from
the actual substance of mercenary accomplishments. Nonetheless,
the movement to regulate the use of mercenaries has had considera-
ble strength.
This article will discuss the role of mercenaries in conflicts that
have occured over the past twenty years. It will then focus on identi-
fying the current law that may effectuate the control of mercenary
activities. Finally, the article will examine the strengths and weak-
nesses of current proposals for regulation.
I. MERCENARIES AND MYTHS
Mercenaries have historically generated attitudes of mistrust,
distaste and fear.' Curiously, the modern literature on mercenaries is
sparse. Moreover, the analyses that exist do not justify the intensity
of the present reaction against mercenary activities. This reaction
may, in part, be a response to the mercenary aided coup in the
Comoros in May 1978,6 and the claim that mercenaries were in-
volved in the Vanuatu Civil War of August 1980.7 In addition, the
attempted coup by mercenaries on the Seychelles in November, 1981,
may have also provided additional impetus to the effort to legislate
prohibitions upon their recruitment and use.8 However, a careful ex-
4. BURCHETT & ROEBUCK, supra note 3, at 17.
5. As to the Foreign Legion, Gerassi notes that "while their exploits made them heroes
to Hollywood, they were villains to the local populations in places such as Morocco, the Sa-
hara, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria and Lebanon, where they enforced the colonial rule they had
already spearheaded." Gerassi, supra note 3, at 46.
6. In May of 1978, a small force of mercenaries led by Bob Denard, who had fought
earlier in the Congo, engineered a coup to restore a regime previously ousted in 1975. N.Y.
Times, May 14, 1978, at 8, col. 4. The OAU entertained a motion to expel the new government
from participation in the organization because of its use of mercenaries. N. Y. Times, July 14,
1978, at 6, col. 4. Subsequently, the government dismissed Denard from his position. N.Y.
Times, September 28, 1978, at 41, col. 1.
7. When the former Anglo-French colony of New Hebrides received its independence a
secessionist movement arose. The ECONOMIST noted that ". . .foreign funds and white men of
several nationalities were involved in the secessionist rebellion..." ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1981,
at 45; see also N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1980, at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 1980, at 5, col. 6.
8. In late 1981, an expedition of mercenaries attempted to overthrow the socialist gov-
ernment of the Seychelle Islands. The mercenaries were in favor of ex-President James
Mancham, who had previously been deposed by a coup in 1977. The coup d'etat failed, and
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amination of the role of mercenaries in various conflicts over the past
twenty years demonstrates that the attention given to mercenaries is
directed toward a symbol that represents something quite apart from
the substantive role they have played.
The modem concern with mercenaries began in the early 1960's
as a result of their use by various political factions fighting for con-
trol of the Congo. Perhaps the most notable instance of their use was
by the secessionist government of Katanga Province, which was led
by Moise Tshombe.9 After the secessionist movement in the
Katanga province was quashed, the central government employed
mercenaries to assist in suppressing the Simba revolt. Again in 1966
mercenaries were employed by the Mobutu government to quell an-
other revolt in Katanga.10 Subsequently, in 1967 two groups of mer-
cenaries conducted an unsuccessful series of operations against the
central government in an effort to bring Moise Tshombe back into
power. "
The apprehension generated by mercenary troops is understand-
able. In the Congo mercenaries were utilized not only to support a
secessionist movement, but were also used by the central government
to put down a challenge by an extremist faction. In addition, they
were employed in an attempt to overthrow the central government
itself. The concern becomes even more understandable considering
the fact that many of the same mercenaries played parts in all three
operations. 2 Moreover, both the Federal Government of Nigeria
and the secessionists in Biafra employed mercenaries, and in Angola
both the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA) and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) utilized mercenary help.'
3
The mere reversal in loyalty, however, does not totally explain
the antipathy towards mercenary involvement. Neither does an ob-
forty-four of those involved hijacked an Indian airliner and fled to South Africa. The South
African government eventually brought charges for hijacking against those who participated in
the operation. See ECONOMIsT, Dec. 5, 1981, at 47; N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
9. G. HEMPSTONE, REBELS, MERCENARIES AND DIVIDENDS: THE KATANGA STORY
(1962). See generally CLARKE, supra note 3; MOCKLER, supra note 3, at 155-171. For United
Nations operations, see E. LEFEVER, CRISIS IN THE CONGO: A UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN
ACTION (1968).
10. CLARKE, supra note 3, at 68.
11. ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 1967, at 713-714; ECONOMIST Sept. 30, 1967, at 1179-1180;
ECONOMIST, July 22, 1967, at 309-310.
12. See generally MOCKLER, supra note 3.
13. Marcum, Lessons of Angola, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 407 (1976); BURCHETT & ROEBUCK,
supra note 3; Hearings, supra note 3.
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jective account of their overall military effectiveness. The merce-
naries enjoyed success in the politically fragmented Congo because of
superior training, organization and weaponry. Under these condi-
tions they often had remarkable success even though they were sig-
nificantly outnumbered. However, as the training and efficiency of
the Congolese army improved, the ablity of mercenary troops to af-
fect outcomes declined accordingly. After Mobutu demobilized the
mercenary companies, the Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC), "the
black army with the lowest reputation on the African continent,"
succeeded in dealing a decisive defeat to those troops involved in the
"mercenary's revolt."' 4
Casualties among the mercenary forces in the Congo were quite
high. The mercenary performance in the Nigerian civil war should
"make all potential employers suspicious of even their professional
capabilites."' 15 In other conflicts, mercenary effectiveness generally
derived from their technical knowledge of advanced weapons and
tactics; they served primarily as training officers and seldom as dis-
tinct and separate fighting units. 6
Whatever their actual effectiveness in individual conflicts, the
mercenary has become the symbol of racism and neocolonialism
within the Afro-Asian bloc. No matter who the mercenaries served
the scenario has always been the same: white soldiers of fortune
fighting black natives. The fact that white South Africans have con-
tributed large numbers to mercenary forces has given credence to this
perception. This perception is also supported by the intervention in
southern Angola by regular South African troops accompanied by
"Portuguese and assorted mercenaries."' 7 Moreover, the United
States' good faith in controlling mercenary activity has also become
suspect as a substantial number of Americans fought in the Rhode-
sian army.
14. MOCKLER, supra note 3, at 278.
15. Id. at 275.
16. J. DE ST. JORRE, THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR (1972).
17. Marcum, supra note 13, at 417. The United States policy regarding this mercenary
involvement is interesting. Mockler asserts that the mercenary leaders in the Congo attempted
to discourage Americans from enlisting in light of American laws and the authorities. See
generally MOCKLER, supra note 3. The four hundred or so Americans serving in the Rhode-
sian army in the late 1970's called themselves the "Crippled Eagles," because they felt the
United States government harassed them. Moore, The Soldiers of Fortune, N.Y. Times, July
28, 1978, at A23, col. 2.
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II. TRADITIONAL VIEWS
An initial problem in controlling the use of mercenaries is the
paucity of modem legal analysis and precedent concerning the prob-
lem. Some early legal writers raised moral questions regarding the
practice. These concerns, however, were overridden as a result of the
integral part that the use of force played in the western State sys-
tem."8 Gradually, the use of mercenaries in Europe declined as na-
tionalism became an increasingly important factor. Outside of
Europe, however, the use of mercenaries in colonial conflicts re-
mained common. The French Foreign Legion stands as the best ex-
ample of a mercenary force recruited specifically to serve as the
guarantor of colonial occupation. 9
In the period prior to 1945, some concern with mercenaries can
be found in the development of the law of neutrality. For example,
the use of national territory for the recruitment or enlistment of mer-
cenaries within a national territory began to be considered an act in
support of the belligerent. Such recruitment often resulted in claims
for belligerent retaliation. Provisions prohibiting mercenary recruit-
ment on national territory were therefore incorporated into the 1907
Hague Conventions.2 ° The obligations, however, were limited to po-
licing national territory and did not extend to preventing nationals
from crossing the border in order to offer their services to a belliger-
ent. Several States enacted domestic legislation to reinforce the inter-
national obligation, and a few went beyond the minimal obligations
and sought to control the actions of citizens who might seek to enlist
in foreign armies.2 1
The United States, for example, has a long traditon of legislation
controlling foreign enlistment by its own nationals.22 Early laws
18. Burmester, supra note 3, at 41-42. See also HINSLEY, POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF
PEACE (1963).
19. See generally BAYLEY, supra note 1; PRESTON, WISE & WERNER, supra note 1; R.
SMITH, MERCENARIES AND MANDARINS: THE EVER VICTORIOUS ARMY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY CHINA (1978).
20. Convention Respecting War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 4-6, 205 Parry's T.S. 395.
The duty regarding the control of mercenary involvement is considered part of neutral duties,
particularly the neutral State's obligation to remain impartial. 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 703-704, 758 (1922);
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 703 (Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1952); 2 J. WESTLAKE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (2d ed. 1913).
21. The extended obligation is embodied in Central and Latin American treaty law. Eg.,
General Treaty of Peace and Amity of the Central American States, Feb. 7, 1923, art. 14, in 2
HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 901 (1932); Havana Convention on Maritime Neu-
trality, Feb. 10, 1928, art. 23, 47 Stat. 1989, T.S. No. 845, 135 L.N.T.S. 187.
22. See Leashing the Dogs of War, supra note 3, at 595-99.
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were inspired by a pragmatic calculation regarding the strength of
the new republic and a desire to remain aloof from the struggles in
Europe. In addition, there existed a general antipathy toward the use
of mercenaries that originated from contact with the Hessian and
Hanoverian soldiers who fought for the British in the Revolutionary
War.2 3 These laws reflected the provisions of the customary law
since they prohibited the organization of military expeditions within
United States territory for use against nations at peace with the
United States.
The Neutrality Act of 1917 stated that American citizens were
not to take part as belligerents in foreign conflicts.24 United States
government policy was controlled prior to 1917 by Wiborg v. United
States,25 in which the United States Supreme Court held that the
government had no power to prevent citizens from joining foreign
armies if they did so outside the United States. Ineffective enforce-
ment weakened the general thrust of the Neutrality Act, and in 1939
Congress reaffflirmed the prohibition against leaving the United
States to enlist in foreign armed services.26 This restatement and re-
vision was directed against the large numbers of volunteers who had
left the United States to serve in the Abraham Lincoln Battalion in
the Spanish Civil War. The Roosevelt Administration actively at-
tempted to discourage enlistments but chose not to prosecute viola-
tors. Likewise, the Administration did not take action against those
Americans who, before United States involvement, chose to join ar-
mies who were fighting against the Axis powers in World War 11.27
These early laws prohibited mercenary activity by implication.
23. See Dumbauld, Neutrality Laws of the United States, 31 AM. J. INT'L L. 258 (1937).
See also A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES (F.
Deak & P. Jessup eds. 1939).
24. 22 U.S.C. § 411 et. seq. (1964).
25. 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 959(a) (1976), states:
"Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains an-
other to enlist or enter himself, or goes beyond the jurisdiction of the United States
with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign province, state,
colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seamen on board any vessel of
war, letter or margue, or privateer, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.
See H. THOMAS, THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR (1961); N. PADELFORD, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND DIPLOMACY IN THE SPANISH CIVIL STRIFE 311 (1939).
27. Despite the 1939 legislation, the Federal Government ignored the large number of
United States citizens who volunteered to fight for Allied Powers prior to the United States'
entry into World War II. The conflicts prior to United States entry into World War II provide
an interesting prelude to the problem of "politically motivated" volunteers versus other partici-
pants. See R. R9SENSTONE, CRUSADE OF THE LEFT 89-90 (1969).
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United States law did not distinguish between those individuals who
emigrated to enlist for political or ideological purposes and those
who emigrated to enlist as mercenaries. However, the one case de-
cided in the inter-war period under the neutrality statutes did involve
recruitment for mercenary puposes.2" In 1919 the United States
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a Mexican national residing
in the United States who had recruited United States nationals to
fight for insurgents challenging a government of Mexico which was
recognized by the United States. The recruitment activity occurred
on United States territory, and as such violated the provisions against
active recruitment within territorial jurisdiction.29
After World War II significant changes occurred in the law
which regulated the use of force in international politics. However,
none of the major instruments adopted by the world community ex-
pressly addressed the use and recruitment of mercenaries. Given the
conflicts, ideological and otherwise, that flared immediately follow-
ing the war, the regulation of mercenary activity was a minor con-
cern. By the 1960's the appearance of mercenaries in moderately
large numbers in Africa, especially in Katanga, caused the concept of
mercenaries to assume importance. Even so, the response of most
States since that time has been to do little more than re-affirm Article
2(4) of the UN Charter,30 and to restate the traditional law as a logi-
cal implication.
The use of mercenaries in colonial territories against "move-
ments for national liberation and independence" was eventually de-
clared a criminal act by UN General Assembly Resolution 246531 in
the late 1960's. As such, mercenaries were designated as "outlaws."
This position reappears in subsequent resolutions dealing with
28. Gayon v. McCarthy, 252 U.S. 171 (1919). In 1981, U.S. authorities, in co-operation
with Canadian authorities, prevented and subsequently prosecuted a mercenary expedition
aimed at overthrowing the government of Dominica. The operation was planned, financed and
launched from United States territory. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1981, at 6. col. 4. The operation
included Canadian and American mercenaries and "members of the Ku Klux Klan and neo-
Nazi groups. N.Y. Times, May 17, 1981, at 8, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 18, 1981, at 12,
col. 1.
29. This decision is consistent with that in the Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897), where a
vessel had been supplied and armed for the purpose of aiding Cuban insurgents against Spain.
The U.S. was then at peace with Spain.
30. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
31. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 2465, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 4, U.N. Doc.
A/7218 (1968).
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colonialism, and marks an important departure from the collective
liability of the traditional law toward individual criminal liability.a2
These resolutions have also called upon third party States to affirm
traditional law against permitting recruitment and to pass laws
which forbid nationals from engaging in mercenary activity.
The 1972 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention for
the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa reflects the trends found in
these United Nations resolutions.3 The OAU Convention extends
State obligations regarding the control of the activities of its nationals
by making States responsible for the prohibition and punishment of
any activities connected with mercenaries which may occur within
their jurisdiction.34 This departure from the traditional law derives
from the obligation that the OAU Convention places on individuals
who meet its requirements. These individuals must either fulfill the
requirements in Article One which defines the term "mercenary," or
32. Subsequent resolutions forbade the use of mercenaries by "colonial and racist re-
gimes" against "national liberation movements." General Assembly Resolution 3103 repre-
sents the culmination of the trends described in the text. It states in pertinent part:
Reaffirming the declarations made in General Assembly resolutions 2548 (XXIV) of
11 December 1969 and 2708 (XXV) of 14 December 1970 that the practice of using
mercenaries against national liberation movements in the Colonial Territories consti-
tutes a criminal act...
5. The use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national libera-
tion movements struggling for their freedom and independence from the yoke of
colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal act and the merce-
naries should accordingly be punished as criminals.
Basic Principles of the Legal Status of the Combatants Struggling Against Colonial and Alien
Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (1973); see also Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp
(No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
One must note the difficulty of applying the operative terms of these resolutions to the
situations in the Congo, Nigeria and Angola. These cases suggest that banning the employment
of mercenaries has little effect other than providing additional grist for victor's justice in the
event that the incumbent regime fell to the "liberation movement" or, as in Angola, that one of
a number of contending groups succeeded in gaining control over other contenders. Salmon
summarizes the problem:
Aussi la premiere question a se poser est de savior si toutes les situations appelees
dans le.langage de la science politique 'guerre de liberation nationale' trouvent leur
contrepartie dans des concepts juridiques? Ou encore, il convient tout d'abord de
determiner comment le droit integre les diverses situations de guerre de liberation
nationale?
Salmon, Les Guerres De Liberation Nationale, in A. CAsSESE, THE NEW HUMANITARIAN
LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 55 (1979). A further discussion and analysis of this point applied
in a different context may be found in Taulbee & Anderson, Reprisal Redux, 17 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 337 (1984).
33. O.A.U. Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa, O.A.U. Doc.
CM/433/Rev. L., Annex 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as OAU Convention]; BURCHETr AND
ROEBUCK, supra note 3, at 234; Leashing the Dogs of War, supra note 3, at 613.
34. OAU Convention, supra note 33, art. 2.
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the requirements concerning those who recruit or help mercenaries
through financial aid, training, or protection from prosection. This
departure also arises from the obligations assumed by contracting
States to prevent their nationals from engaging in mercenary activi-
ties as defined by the OAU Convention." In this regard, contracting
States assume the obligation to prosecute all those within their juris-
diction, including nationals, who have been accused of mercenary
activity.36
Despite these innovations, the OAU Convention does not explic-
itly forbid the employment of mercenaries. According to Article I, a
government, or any other group, may not use mercenaries to defend
itself from the activities of a liberation movement recognized by the
OAU. However, a government may engage non-nationals to defend
itself from those liberation movements which fall outside the defined
category of mercenary. This anomaly was not an oversight, but the
result of careful drafting which came from the African governments'
desire to give support to "national liberation movements" without
creating conditions which might encourage dissident groups within
their own borders.37
The trial of thirteen foreigners in Angola in 1976 focused inter-
national attention on mercenary activity. All of the defendants were
convicted of the crime of "being mercenaries." 3 Four were sen-
tenced to death and the others to long prison sentences. The Ango-
lan government invited a large number of outside observers to watch
the trials and to participate in the drafting of a new convention. The
Luanda Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppresion of
Mercenarism39 was issued in the wake of the trials. The Luanda
35. Id. arts. 2,3.
36. Id. arts. 6,7.
37. Suter, in his discussion of the legislative history of Geneval Additional Protocol I and
Geneva Additional Protocol II states:
Nearly all Third World states, owing to the haphazard way that their frontiers were
delineated by their colonizers, have problems with minorities or tribes. . . The
Third World's references to "national liberation movements" were more precise than
might appear at first. These governments have sought to ensure that existing states
(other than South Africa and Israel) did not develop such "movements."
SUTER, AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF GUERRILLA WARFARE: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
LAW MAKING 147 (1983).
38. For accounts of the trials see BURCHETr & ROEBUCK, supra note 3, chs. 8, 14; Cesner
& Brant, Law of the Mercenary: An International Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 339 (1977)
(Robert E. Cesner served as chief counsel for the American defendants in the Luanda trials).
39. Draft Convention on the Prevention and Suppression of Mercenarism, June, 1976,
reprinted in BURCHETT & ROEBUCK, supra note 3, at 237 [hereinafter cited as Luanda Draft
Convention]. See also Leashing the Dogs of War, supra note 3, at 615.
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Draft Convention emphasized the individual responsiblity of State
representatives, as well as those individuals defined as mercenaries.
Article Three of the Luanda Draft Convention explicitly made
government members involved in employing, aiding or recruiting
mercenaries criminally liable. The failure of a State to punish those
officials who had partaken in such activity would create international
responsibility on the part of the offending State." Article Five of the
Luanda Draft Convention reflected the attitude of the judicial panel
in the Luanda trials by providing that: "A mercenary bears responsi-
bility both for being a mercenary and for any other crime committed
by him as such."4 1 Perhaps the most important departure from pre-
vious attempts occurred in Article Four of the Luanda Draft Con-
vention, which deprived mercenaries of the status of lawful
combatants. As a result, captured mercenaries no would longer en-
joyed the protected status of prisoners of war. This provision was
subsequently incoporated into the Geneva Additional Protocols,42
although the Geneva conferees adopted a definition of mercenary
more limited in scope than that contained in the Luanda Draft
Convention.
III. MERCENARY: A LEGAL DEFINITION
What defines a mercenary? Most of the work dealing with mer-
cenaries has not addressed the question of a precise definition. The
question of a legal definition first became an important issue at the
1976 and 1977 sessions of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanita-
rian Law.43 These sessions drafted Additional Protocols I and II to
the 1949 Geneva Convention." Additionally, the establishment of
40. BURCHETT & ROEBUCK, supra note 3, at 237.
41. Id. Cesner and Brant note that this distinction was made by the Angolan Court, but
had no bearing on the sentences handed out. Only two of the accused were proven to have
committed crimes. Cesner & Brant, supra note 38, at 351.
42. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), U.N. Doc. A/32/144
Annex 1 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Addi-
tional Protocol I]; Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II),
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex 2 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L. LEGAL MAT. 1442 (1977) [herein-
after cited as Additional Protocol II]. For an extended commentary see Green, The New Law
of Armed Conflict, 15 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 11-12 (1977); Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed
Conflict: Toward the Definition of International Armed Conflict, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 37 (1971).
43. See Tercinet, Les Mercenaires et le Droit International, 23 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT 269 (1977); Van Deventer, Mercenaries at Geneva, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 811 (1976);
Yusuf, Mercenaries in the Law of Armed Conflict, in CASSESE, supra note 32, at 113.
44. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Vol. 15
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the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Conven-
tion Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mer-
cenaries again focused attention on the construction of a legal
definition.45 The Committee, which has met annually since its initial
authorization, has not yet agreed upon a definition.
There is a need to examine the issues connected with construct-
ing an adequate legal definition of the term mercenary. A precise
definition is absolutely essential since individuals will be deprived of
important legal rights as a consequence of falling into the proscribed
category. Moreover, under the evolving international law dealing
with mercenaries, States will be forced to assume the obligation to
control certain activities that will in large measure be determined by
the scope of the definition.
As with most controversial issues, this undertaking requires an
evaluation of a number of political factors. A definition must balance
competing interests and must also balance precision with signifi-
cance. 46 As such, it must strike a medium between requirements
which provide general parameters for evaluating contextual ele-
ments, and requirements which attempt rigorous and exhaustive de-
scriptions of persons, situations and activities. An overly detailed
definition may prove too rigid and resistant to accomodate change as
circumstances demand. Conversely, a simple and brief definition
which permits discretion in application leaves open the possibility of
abuse. If the definition is too general the interpretation of terms may
be colored by ideological or political calculation.
Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75
U.N.T.S. 3 1; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No.
3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
45. The members of the Committee are Algeria, Angola, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barba-
dos, Benin, Bulgaria, Canada, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Re-
public, Federal Republic of Germany, Guyana, India, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Mongolia,
Nigeria, Portugal, Seychelles, Spain, Suriname, Togo, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United
Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Sambia. The Chairman is Mohamed
Sahnoun (Algeria); Vice Chairmen: Luigi Ferrari Bravo (Italy), Ernest Besley Maycock (Bar-
bados) and Boris I. Tarasyuk (Ukrainian SSR); Rapporteur: Moritaka Hayashi (Japan). Togo
replaced Senegal for the 1983 session of the Ad Hoc Committee. Cuba, Egypt, Mozambique,
Nicaragua and Viet Nam have observer status.
At its initial working session in 1982 the Committee divided into two working groups.
Working Group A focused on the questions concerning the definition of mercenary and indi-
vidual responsibility. Working Group B addressed the questions of preventive measures, dam-
age reparation and settlement of disputes. Additional Protocol I, supra note 43.
46. The classic discussion of the problems of constructing a legal definition is found in J.
STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1959).
1985
11
Taulbee: Myths, Mercenaries and Contemporary International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1985
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
The concepts of motive and origin serve to define the term mer-
cenary. Mercenaries are non-nationals who fight for monetary gain
rather than loyalty or idealism. They are generally bands of soldiers
temporarily united under leaders of strong personality who fight for
pay and the spoils of war. They are usually indifferent to the claims
of legality or the interests of their native country.
By analyzing each of these two operative concepts, it becomes
possible to point to the difficulty of using either concept, or both, as a
definitive test in specific situations. While international law employs
nationality as a parameter in helping to determine the apportionment
of rights and obligations,4" the most effective link between an individ-
ual and a specific territory may not be nationality.49 For example,
non-nationals often reside in territories where conflicts erupt. De-
spite their non-national status these individuals may feel they have
substantial interests to protect. Moreover, they may also possess
combat skills or technical expertise useful to a party to the conflict.
As a result, the party is often willing to pay a premium wage to ob-
tain such knowledge and skills. According to both the OAU Con-
vention and the Luanda Draft Convention such individuals could be
considered mercenaries. Their status depends upon which of the par-
ties in a given conflict they decide to join. The critical test in these
two early attempts at a definition arises in instances where there is
opposition to movements for self-determination or liberation.50
The outlines of the current definitonal debate were established
during deliberations over the inclusion of Article 47 in Additional
Protocol .51 The issues related to the problem of distinguishing
47. MOCKLER, supra note 3, at 23.
48. In particular, nationality serves as the essential link between the individual and the
protection afforded by international law. Oppenheim notes: "Such individuals as do not pos-
sess any nationality enjoy, in general, no protection whatever, and if they are aggrieved by a
State they have no means of redress since there is no State which is competent to take up their
case." 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 640 (Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955).
49. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4.
50. BURCHErr & ROEBUCK, supra note 33, at 234.
51. Article 47 of the Additional Protocol I defines a mercenary as any person who:
(a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material compensa-
tion substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks
and function in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled
by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as
member of its armed forces.
Vol. 15
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"mercenaries" from other foreign "volunteers." These issues, which
can be stated quite concisely, are: (1) whether a distinction should
be drawn between non-resident non-nationals and resident non-na-
tionals; (2) whether a "mercenary" includes all who meet certain op-
erative tests, or whether some overt actions directly related to
hostilities are necessary; (3) whether outside private forces and na-
tional troops should be considered different from third party States;
(4) whether individuals recruited for a specific conflict should be dis-
tinguished from those recruited under other circumstances; (5)
whether motive should be defined through objective tests; and (6)
whether a legal distinction should be drawn between "legitimate"
and "non-legitimate" movements for national liberation?52
The definition of mercenary in Additional Protocol I gives con-
servative answers to all of the above questions. This definition pro-
vides that to be considered a mercenary, one must be: (1) specifically
recruited for a conflict, (2) a non-national and a non-resident of any
Party to the conflict, (3) involved as a private person, (4) directly
involved in hostile activities, and (5) motivated by private gain.
53
Furthermore, in order to qualify as a mercenary under this definition
an individual must meet all of these tests. Those identified as merce-
naries have no right to the protected status of a combatant or pris-
oner of war.54 While the specific purpose of the Additional Protocols
I and II is to extend protected status to those participating in strug-
gles against "colonial domination," "racist regimes," or "alien domi-
nation," their provisions also apply to the utilization of mercenaries
in general. The use of mercenaries in movements for national libera-
tion is not singled out. In this respect, the Additional Protocol I
definition does not reflect the general thrust and language of the
Additional Protocol I, supra note 43, art. 47 (2).
52. For a brief discussion of the legislative history of these issues at Geneva see Yusuf,
supra note 44.
53. See supra note 51.
54. Some question remains as to what deprivation of combatant status would mean for an
individual. Burmester interprets the legislative history of the article to mean that "[I]t is
clearly understood that a mercenary is entitled to the basic humanitarian treatment and protec-
tions provided under the Protocol for persons in the power of a party to the conflict who are
not otherwise entitled to more favorable treatment." Burmester, supra note 3, at 55. In addi-
tion, the United States Supreme Court, in ex parte Quirin, declared that "Lawful combatants
are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful
combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful."
317 U.S. 1 (1942); Baxter, So-called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas and Saboteurs,
32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 339 (1951); see also Draper, The Status ofCombatants and the Question
of Guerilla Warfare, 42 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 175 (1971).
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United Nations resolutions or of the OAU and Luanda Draft
Conventions.
Western States have criticized the Additional Protocol I defini-
tion because of its stress on motivation. The Diplock Report states
that motivation cannot be an essential definitional element because
motivation cannot be objectively ascertained.55 Although motivation
should not comprise the sole definitional element, any objection to
the reliance on motivation as an element of a definition fails to be
convincing. Domestic law regularly makes critical distinctions based
upon motivation.56
There is also little merit in the objection to the evidence neces-
sary to establish motivation under the test in Additional Protocol I.
The contention is that it would be difficult to obtain the necessary
evidence; a showing of all five elements would require access to the
records of an opposing party to the conflict." This difficulty, how-
ever, exists with all statutes that provide for extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over nationals. Moreover, the question of compensation is
essential in establishing a distinction in motivation. This distinction
is considered vital by African and Socialist States with regard to mer-
.cenaries who serve illegitmate regimes, and non-resident non-nation-
als who volunteer to aid legitimate liberation movements.
If the desire for private gain is removed from the definition of
55. The Commission reported that "Any definition of mercenaries which required positive
proof of motivation would either be unworkable, or so haphazard in its applicaion as between
comparable individuals as to be unacceptable. Mercenaries, we think can only be defined by
reference to what they do." Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire
into the Recruitment of Mercenaries, Cmnd. 6569, para. 7 (August 1976), cited in Burmester,
supra note 3, at 37. For another discussion of the report in relationship to British law see
BURCHETr & ROEBUCK, supra note 3, ch. 13. With respect to the question of "political"
versus other motivations, see Hoare's statement on the difference between the Congo merce-
naries and those who fought in Rhodesia. Hoare states, "Today they are politically motivated
and the money is not all that important to them." Moore, supra note 17, at A23. Moore spent
two years in Rhodesia traveling with mercenaries. He maintains that the Americans fighting
there received only the pay accorded to soldiers serving in the Rhodesian army, which was
considerably less than what they could have earned in the United States Army. He claims that
most Americans enlisted because they saw the Rhodesian conflict as a continuation of a fight
against communist expansion. Id. Clearly, one goal of the African States is to prevent any
similar "volunteer" effort in aid of South Africa. Id.
56. For example, intent is an element of conspiracy, which is defined as follows:
A person is guilty of conspiracy in the first degree when, with the intent that conduct
constituting a class A felony be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to
engage in or cause the performance of such conduct.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105.15.
57. This element is present in many cases where laws specify certain types of extra-territo-
rial jurisdiction. Such difficulties as collecting evidence and procuring witnesses when a crime
occurs outside of territorial jurisdiction are legion.
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mercenary, then the term "mercenary" as ordinarily understood be-
comes devoid of substantive content. "Mercenary" becomes a term
which describes all non-resident non-nationals who choose to oppose
a particular ideological policy preference, or which describes a group
possessing the same status as other combatants. There appears to be
no other alternative tests for distinguishing mercenaries from other
combatants which are as adequate as the motivation test.
At the first session of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Nigerian Del-
egation offered a draft convention which incorporated the definition
of Additional Protocol I. The Committee also added language to Ar-
ticle 2 from the Luanda Draft Convention. This language prohibited
the use of mercenaries against legitimate movements for national lib-
eration.58 The Nigerian Draft Convention also incorporated the
premise that the mere status as a mercenary, as opposed to participa-
tion in specific overt acts, was sufficient to establish criminal
liability.
59
The Additional Protocol I definition represented a compromise.
The deliberations on the Nigerian Draft Convention gave each side
the opportuntiy to re-assert their positions. The United States,
United Kingdom, and other members of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) steadfastly insisted
that criminal liability can only come from the performance of specific
acts of war.' Delagates from Socialist, as well as many African and
58. International Convention Against the Activities of Mercenaries, U.N. Doc.
A/35/366/Add.I at 10-16 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Nigerian Draft Convention]. At the
beginning of the 1983 session France also submitted a Draft Convention for consideration. 38
U.N. GAOR Doc. Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/AC.207/L.15 and Corr.1 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as French Draft Convention]. See also Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting
of an International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mer-
cenaries. 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 43), U.N. Doc. A/37/43 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Report 1982].
59. Article 2 of the Draft Convention which France submitted states:
1. The crime of mercenarism is committed when an individual group or association,
or body corporate registered in that State or representative of a State or the State
itself with the aim of opposing by threat or armed violence the territorial integrity of
another State or the legitimate aspirations of national liberation movements jeopar-
dizes the process of self determination or manifests by overt acts any of the following:
(b) participates as an individual, group or association or body corporate or enlists in
any force. ...
French Draft Convention, supra note 58.
60. Report 82, supra note 58, at 10-11. The debate over this issue is summarized in
paragraphs 35-43. The Western view is shown by summary statements in the Sixth Committee
by Mr. Saint-Martin (Canada) and Mr. DeStoop (Australia). 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (23d mtg.)
at 58, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR. 23 (1983); 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (25th mtg.) at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/38/SR.25 (1983)(statement of Mr. Font (Spain)); 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (61st mtg.) at 2,
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Asian States, sought to broaden the definition of mercenary to in-
clude the idea that mercenary status alone, apart from overt acts,
should carry criminal status.61
Those who advocate the more inclusive definiton argue that the
voluntary act of enlistment signifies intent. Therefore, enlistment
should automatically subject the individual to criminal penalities.62
To make punishment dependent upon direct participation in overt
acts would mean that determination of mercenary status carries no
additional onus. The acts listed in the draft conventions and the
Conference Working Papers would be punishable if committed by
any individual, thereby supplying a necessary deterrence upon
individuals.63
Socialist and African States have also endeavored to extend the
definition to include those "mercenaries" that are not covered by the
Additional Protocol I definition. Some delegations have asserted that
Additional Protocol I covers only situations of international armed
conflict. However, mercenary activity which is damaging to States
has occurred more often in civil wars. It has been argued that any
useful definition must encompass situations of intrastate violence as
well as those that meet the criteria of international armed conflict.
These States also contend that deterrence requires that individuals or
other groups that employ, recruit and train mercenaries should be
considered as principals on equal footing with those who actually
participate in the hostilities, and not just as accomplices.'M
Western delegations have accepted that the Nigerian Draft Con-
vention should address situations outside of those covered by Addi-
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.61 (1983) (statement of Mr. Roucounas (Greece) who expressed the
views of the Member States of the EEC).
The irony of the Western position in this instance is that neither the United States, Great
Britain nor France have ratified Additional Protocol I or Additional Protocol II. As of March
1984, only thirty-one States had ratified Additional Protocol I and only twenty-five had ratified
Additional Protocol II. For an analysis of the problems associated with these two instruments
see SUTER, supra note 37, at 142-53.
61. See 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (21st mtg.) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.20 (1983) (sum-
mary statements of Mr. Khalek (Egypt)); 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (23rd mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc.
A/C.6/38/SR.23 (1983) (statement of Mr. Stepanov (Ukranian SSR)); 38 U.N. GAOR C.6
(27th mtg. Oct.) at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.28 (1983) (statements of Mrs. Ahmadi (Is-
lamic Republic of Iran) and Ms. Malamfu (Zambia)); 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (29th mtg.) at 4,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.29 (1983) (statement of Mr. Bernal (Bolivia)).
62. 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (19th mtg.) at 15-16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.19 (1983) (sum-
mary statement of Mr. Sahnoun, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee).
63. Report 1982, supra note 58, at 6-9.
64. Summary statement of Mr. Khalek (Egypt), supra note 61; summary statement of Mr.
Stepanov (Ukranian SSR), supra note 61; Report 1982, supra note 58, para. 34.
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tional Protocol I. In this regard, these States assert two principal
propositions. First, the definition in Additonal Protocol I did not
apply only to situations of international armed conflict.65 Second,
the definition set out in any future convention should remain consis-
tent with the Additional Protocol I definition in order to retain the
integrity of the regime established by Additional Protocols I and 11.66
Any extension to circumstances outside of international armed con-
flict should be in a form consisent with the definition in Additional
Protocol I. For most Western delegations the correct way of ad-
dressing the problem would be to concentrate on prohibitng certain
acts and activities within a carefully specified context.67 These dele-
gations must widen the contingencies to which the Additional Proto-
col I defintion would apply, rather than expanding the classes of
activities and individuals included in the definition proper.
The draft articles for future discussion submitted as part of the
report of Working Group A of the Ad Hoc Committee6" diverge
somewhat from the conservative emphasis of Additional Protocol I.
These articles embrace a version of the formulation advocated by Af-
rican and Socialist States. However, they adopt the specific offenses
approach for extending the definition to situations other than those
involving international armed conflict. Under the draft articles em-
ployment, training and recruitment become equivalent to direct par-
ticipation within the meaning of the provsions of Additional Protocol
I. This list of prohibited activities reflects the non-Western viewpoint
as well. Mercenaries may not participate in the "suppression of the
struggle of a people for self-determination," nor in acts of "economic
sabotage."69 On the other hand, references to the crime of mercenar-
ism and the criminal responsiblity of States have been eliminated
under the draft articles.
Differences remain over the precise wording of several phrases,
but the resolution of these clauses will not affect the general scope,
structure or thrust of the proposed definition. While States may have
agreed on the elements of a definition, questions regarding the extent
65. Many Western delegations argued that the definition in Additional Protocol I also
covered situations of non-international conflict. See summary statement of Mr. Roucounas
(Greece), supra note 60. See also Report 1982, supra note 58, paras. 73, 78. For a general
discussion of the problems associated with extending regulations to non-international situa-
tions, see Dupuy & Leonetti, La notion de conflit arme a charactere non international, in CAS-
SESE, supra note 32, at 258.
66. Summary statement of Mr. DeStoop, supra note 60.
67. E.g., Report 1982, supra note 58, para. 41.
68. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
69. Report 1982, supra note 58, para. 41.
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of State liability with respect to the proscribed activities have proven
less tractable.
IV. MERCENARIES AND STATE RESPONSIBLITY
Some inevitable overlap exists between the task of Working
Group A and that of Working Group B. Construction of the re-
quirement that States adopt appropriate measures to prevent the
commission of prohibited activites entails important considerations
relating to the nature and scope of State liability. The Nigerian Draft
Convention attempted to implement new obligations with which to
enforce its provisions. Article 15 stipulates that acts or omissions
under the Convention will create international responsiblity on the
part of the offending State.70 Proponents of the Nigerian position
have asserted that effective control of mercenary activity requires its
prevention. Consequently, the primary debate has focused on the
standards of performance with respect to the elimination of merce-
nary activity.
The idea of State responsibility has traditionally been linked to
the concept of territorial sovereignty. The rights of independence
and territorial integrity necessitate the obligation to respect and pro-
tect these same rights of other States. 7' A violation of international
law by a State creates responsiblity if (1) loss or damage resulted
from the act, and (2) the delinquency can be imputed to the State.72
While some commentators have sought to limit the circumstances in
which violations may be imputed directly to the State, few dispute
the validity of these propositions. 3
70. Nigerian Draft Convention, supra note 58, art. 15, Report 1982, supra note 58. Con-
temporary texts tend to treat responsibility almost entirely in terms of "denial of justice" to
aliens perhaps because these cases constitute the bulk of claims practice. See e.g., L. HENKIN,
R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMiT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 685-
780 (1980); J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM:
CASES AND MATERIALS 545-573 (2d ed. 1981).
71. Island of Palmas (U. S. v. Neth.), Hague Ct. Rep. 2d (Scott) 366 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928); Corfu Channel Case (U. K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Merits); GARCIA-AMADOR, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEW TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 340 (1955).
72. See [1969] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, 104-106 (statement of Mr. R. Ago); see also Ago,
Le delit international, R.D.C. 451, 455, 461 (1939). Judge Huber noted: "Responsibility is the
necessary corollary of a right. All rights of an international character involve international
responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met, responsibility entails the duty to make
reparation." Huber, Spanish Zone in Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 641 (1923). See also 1 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
723 (2d ed. 1943).
73. See, e.g., E. BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 217
(1927); Brierly, The Theory of Implied State Complicity, 9 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 42 (1928);
Vol. 15
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Over the past fifty years the primary topic of debate has con-
cerned the connection between the non-performance of duties and
consequent liability.74 The issue becomes ascertaining the standard
of performance required by a State within its own jurisdiction in pro-
tecting the rights of other States. The argument over the standard of
performance in suppression of mercenary activity constitutes only
one aspect of this ongoing debate.
The concept of statehood implies certain capabilities. The as-
sumption that the State has absolute authority over its territory raises
the presumption that, at a minimum, incumbent governments have
the capacity to police activities within their own borders.75 Some
contemporary authors, such as Garcia-Mora, have argued that a
State which fails to prevent a harmful act against another State has
violated an international obligation to preserve world order. Fur-
thermore, even if a State has clearly used all of its means to prevent
an unlawful act against a foreign State, but has not remedied the
situation, it has failed to discharge its obligation and still remains
liable.76 Blum has employed the following reasoning in defending
Israeli actions in Lebanon:
Thus, when one raises the question of [sic] ability of Leba-
non. . .to curb the activities of the various guerrilla organizations,
this arguably might indirectly call in [sic] question the very state-
hood, sovereignty and independence from the viewpoint of inter-
national law. Certainly, a writer cannot be entitled simultaneously
to assert the inability of a State to perform its undoubted legal
obligations and its right to be immune from responsibility in re-
Garner, Responsibility of States for Injuries Suffered by Foreigners within their Territories on
Account of Mob Violence, Riots and Insurrection, 21 PROc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 57 (1927).
74. For an extended discussion of the controversies regarding State responsibility see G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 1957).
75. 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 241-255 (1928).
76. See, e.g., M. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS
OF PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 109 (1962). Burmester argues that:
Private actions of individuals can, in certain circumstances, have a major impact on
interstate relations; and it no longer seems realistic not to impute responsibility to a
state for the actions of persons under its jurisdiction and control in situations likely to
endanger world peace and security. Such a responsibility could arise. . .from the
recognition that the modern state can, and must, exercise control over its nationals so
as to prevent their involvement in activities contrary to international law ...
. . . [Tlhe presence of foreign nationals, especially if on a large scale, can have a
significant impact on any conflict and may draw into the conflict those states whose
nationals are involved.
Burmester's theory is of interest because it would result in a situation of almost total open-
ended liability for States. Burmester, supra note 3, at 45.
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spect of such defaults.7 7
Both arbitral tribunals and courts, however, have been reluctant
to support an absolute standard of liability. Relative standards have
been the rule and traditionally embody two elements: knowledge and
capacity. In the Alabama Claims arbitration, the Tribunal found
that a State is obliged "to exercise due diligence in its own ports and
waters, and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties. ' ' 78 In addition, the
key issue in the Corfu Channel Case was whether Albania had or
should have had "constructive knowledge" of the mines in the
strait.7 9
Knowledge of a harmful act or a potentially damaging situation
is not in and of itself sufficient to establish responsibility. Tribunals
have been reluctant to hold governments responsible for damages
caused by individuals and groups in situations which are beyond the
State's capacity to control."0 Traditional international law, however,
requires a State to make a good faith effort to extend reasonable pro-
tection or punish offenders. If mitigating circumstances can be
shown, a State may still be absolved from responsibility81 despite the
failure to prevent, punish or otherwise make reparation.82
77. Blum, The Beirut Raid and the International Double Standard, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 85
(1970).
78. The standard of due diligence became an issue of contention between the United
States and the United Kingdom in the Alabama Claims arbitration arising out of damages
claimed by the United States for the actions of the warship Alabama during the Civil War. The
British argued that responsibility is limited to such care as a State usually takes in its own
affairs (diligentia quam in suis). The Tribunal rejected the British argument, ruling that the
"..due diligence referred to in the first and third of the rules ought to be exercised by neutral
governments in exact proportion to the risk to which either of the belligerents may be exposed
due to a failure to fulfill the obligations of neutrality on their part." 1 J. MOORE, INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATIONS 495, 682 (1976).
Under the Alabama Claims decision, the standard of risk to belligerent interests came
close to mandating an absolute standard of responsibility because the possibility existed that a
State could be held liable even though it had taken every precaution within its means to avert
the damage. The 1907 Hague Convention substituted "means at its disposal" for due diligence,
bringing the operative test into conformity with the with the British view. See Corfu Channel
Case, supra note 71, at 22.
79. Gorfu Channel Case, supra note 71, at 18.
80. Huber, supra note 72, at 730; Home Missionary Society Arbitration (U.S. v. U.K.) 6
R. Int'l Arb. Awards 42 (1933).
81. Noues (U.S. v. Pan.), United States and Panamainian General Claims Arbitration
155, 6 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 325 (1933); Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens Caused by Terrorist Activity, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 217 (1977).
82. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Sixth session
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Western States have steadfastly resisted any suggestion of abso-
lute responsibility. They have advanced three main arguments in de-
fense of this position. First, an explicit reference to State
responsibility implies that other conventions which do not expressly
mention it will not establish responsibility for wrongful acts. Second,
the nature of the issues suggests that a statement which involves only
one or two articles would provide only a superficial treatment of im-
portant concerns. Third, the International Law Commission (ILC)
currently has undertaken the major project of drafting a comprehen-
sive convention on State responsibility. Thus, the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee must be careful not to pre-empt the work of the ILC, particularly
if such activity creates standards different from those which may be
included in the ILC convention.
8 3
Western States have also resisted the idea that a State which
fails to prevent mercenary activity should be liable for damages to the
victim of such an omission. These States have pointed out that Arti-
cle 15 has no parallel in other conventions considered relevant to the
work of the Committee. While no one has denied that a breach of
international obligation gives rise to responsiblitity, states have ar-
gued that the question of reparation should be left to customary
practice.84
These arguments indicate the desire to avoid precedent that may
be cited in other areas. It is also clear that in practice the obligations
imposed by the convention in terms of prevention of recruitment
would likely apply only to Western States and South Africa, the prin-
cipal sources of recruitment to date. The United States is unlikely to
accept any guidelines more stringent than those embodied in current
legislation so long as the Soviet Union has the option to use Cuban or
other troops which are not included in the definition of a mercenary.
Finally, Western States are not likely to accept an absolute standard
of responsiblity when many of the States eager for such a standard
reject it in other contexts.8 5
V. MERCENARIES AND UNITED STATES LAW
United States law is comparable to the customary law of neu-
trality. The most noteworthy aspect of the general thrust of United
83. See, e.g., 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (23d mtg.) at 5, 16, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.23
(1983)(summary statement of Mr. Leile (Portugal)); 38 U.N. GAOR C.6 (26th mtg.) at 14,
U.N. Doc. A/C.6/38/SR.26 (1983) (summary statement of Mr. Hayashi (Japan)).
84. Report 1982, supra note 58, para. 75, at 22.
85. For an extended discussion of this view, see Taulbee & Anderson, supra note 32.
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States legislation regarding mercenaries is the reluctance to use na-
tionality as a means of regulating the conduct of citizens outside
United States jurisdiction. When compared to European countries
the United States is extremely conservative in legislating jurisdic-
tional claims over the extra-territorial conduct of its citizens.
s6
Current statutes prohibit activities within territory which would
injure the interest of States currently at peace with the United States.
Service in a foreign force,87 conspiracy to destroy the property of a
foreign State,88 and the planning or financing of an expedition against
a foreign State89 are proscribed. The scope of each of these provi-
sions is limited to positive acts performed within the territorial juris-
diction of the United States. In United States v. Dane,9" the United
States District Court for the Ninth Circuit went so far as to suggest
that mercenary activities outside United States jurisdiction do not
violate United States law.
The most severe of the current laws that apply to American citi-
zens who enlist as mercenaries is 8 U.S.C. section 1481(a)(3). This
statute provides that American citizens who enlist in the armed
forces of a foreign State without the express written permission of the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall lose their citi-
zenship.91 However, no administration to date has enforced its pro-
86. The United States has extended jurisdiction through the nationality principle to
crimes of treason, income tax evasion and draft evasion. HENKIN, PUGH, SCHACTER & SMIT,
supra note 70, at 445. In comparison, French criminal law applies in almost every instance to
citizens whether in France or abroad. See Delaume, Jurisdiction Over Crimes Committed
Abroad French and American Law, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 173 (1952).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 958 (1976). This section provides:
Any citizen of the United States who, within the jurisdiction thereof, accepts and
exercises a commission to serve a foreign province, state, colony, district, or people, in
war, against any province, state, district, colony or people, with whom the United
States is at peace, shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned for not more
than three years, or both.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 956(a) (1976). This section provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons within the jurisdiction of the United States conspire to injure
or destroy specific property situated within a foreign country and belonging to a for-
eign government. . .and if one or more such persons commits an act within the juris-
diction of the United States to effect this object ....
89. 8 U.S.C. § 960 (1976). The statute states, in pertinent part:
Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or
prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or
naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or
dominion of an foreign province or state, or of a colony, district or people with whom
the United States is at peace...
90. 570 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1977).
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1976). According to the statute a citizen may lose nationality
by "entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless, prior to such entry or
service, such entry or service is specifically authorized in writing by the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Defense."
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visions. On the basis of parallel cases, commentators have suggested
that the statute may be unconstitutional as violative of due process.
92
United States courts have been extremely reluctant to strip native
citizens of their rights unless the individual has expressly waived
them. 93 As such, a number of the provisions of the Draft Articles run
counter to historic United States policy. Others, which suppress the
dissemination of information, contravene First Amendment
guarantees. 94
VI. CONCLUSION
Third World States, particularly African States, have led the
drive to negotiate a multilateral convention concerning the use of
mercenaries. This is not surprising, as most contemporary merce-
nary involvement has occurred on the African continent. The major-
ity of recent commentaries argue that the increased use of
mercenaries during the past few years necessitates the adoption and
implementation of a convention. 5 However, the meaning of the ne-
92. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252 (1980).
93. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). In Afroyim, the United States Supreme
Court held a provision of Section 1481 which deprived a person of citizenship if he or she voted
in a foreign election to be unconstitutional. The Court agreed that U.S. citizenship could not
be revoked unless an individual voluntarily renounced it. The unanswered question remains,
however, whether enrollment in a military service other than that of the United States, and the
swearing of an oath of allegiance constitute an express waiver? Cf Vance, supra note 92. Ear-
lier the U.S. Supreme Court had issued conflicting judgements. See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44 (1958) (upholding the right of Congress to pass legislation "de-nationalizing American citi-
zens who voted in foreign elections"). Cf Prop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 (1958) (holding that
de-nationalization as a punishment was barred by the Eighth Amendment, and therefore un-
constitutional.) See Duval, Expatriation under United States Law, Perez to Afroyim: The
Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REv. 408 (1970) (Attorney Gen-
eral's Statement of Interpretation of Afroyin v. Rusk); 34 FED. REG. 1079 (1969).
94. The quintessential test case here involves Robert Brown, the publisher of Soldier of
Fortune magazine. Brown's activities, particualarly those publicizing opportunities for "pro-
fessional adventurers," have come under attack from many quarters. Attention focused on
Brown after the execution in Angola of Daniel Gearhart, a mercenary who had been employed
after placing an advertisement in the magazine. Despite a number of investigations into his
activities, no indictments resulted. N.Y. Times, May 4, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
95. See genrally Burmester, supra note 3; Leashing the Dogs of War, supra note 3.
Burmester argues that mercenaries must be controlled because violence precipitated by private
action will cause governments to become inadvertantly involved in conflicts where they have
little or no interest because they will feel compelled to extend protection to their nationals.
Burchett and Roebuck assert that mercenary forces ought to be controlled because they offer a
mechanism whereby governments may intervene "unofficially," thereby disavowing any con-
nection if the operation fails. BURCHETT & ROEBUCK, supra note 3.
The expense of mercenary troops, their checkered record of performance, the antipathy by
the Third World States toward their use, and the availability of official and covert military aid
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gotiations is more symoblic than substantive. The current effort and
concern is directed toward a phenomenon essentially transitory in
nature. The reaction, when compared to the historical record, is out
of proportaion to the actual threat.9 6 In no recent instance have mer-
cenary troops made a significant difference in the eventual outcome
of a military conflict. In addition, the chaotic conditions associated
with the rapid movement toward independence by Third World na-
tions has lessened. Moreover, as national armies have become more
skilled the incentives and opportunities for mercenaries have dimin-
ished considerably.9" Equally important is the fact that as decoloni-
alization has become a reality the tacit support often given by ex-
colonial powers to mercenary activity in support of favored factions
has run its course. In sum, the predictions of (1) increased opportu-
nities for mercenary activity,9" (2) fears that activities of individual
mercenaries might draw their governments into unwanted conflicts,
99
and (3) the contention that mercenaries offer cheap intervention 0
have not proven accurate.
A convention may nevertheless emerge from the efforts of the
Ad Hoc Committee studying the problem of mercenary activities.
Whatever its final format, its reach and impact will likely remain lim-
ited. If the proposed convention retains the provisions mandating
strongly suggest that large scale employment of soldiers of fortune was an aberration produced
by a unique set of conditions which have now passed. Individuals may still find employment as
technical advisers or specialists, but it is highly unlikely that legions such as Mike Hoare's
"Wild Geese" in the Congo will re-appear as an important factor. Hoare received a ten year
sentence for his part in organizing the Seychelles operation. TIME, Aug. 9, 1982, at 30. SUTER,
supra note 37, at 146. Suter notes that the expectation of the Afro-Asian states in 1974 was
that by the time that Additional Protocol I entered into force, "most if not all of the present
wars of national liberation would have been resolved." See also MOCKLER, supra note 3, at
276-277.
96. See supra notes 7, 17 and accompanying text.
97. Mockler argues that in order for most men to become mercenaries the possible tangi-
ble rewards must outweigh the dangers. Mockler writes:
Danger, however, must not outweigh the prospects of riches. The normal mercenary
has always had a horror of being killed. Casualties destroy morale in a mercenary
army far more quickly than in a normal army, and if the war is particularly ferocious
or the enemy particularly skilled, mercenaries will take no part in it.
MOCKLER, supra note 3, at 276-77.
Certain individuals find that intangible motives such as the risk of death or the license to
kill provide sufficient incentive, but these men constitute a very small contemporary minority.
Robert Brown, the publisher of Soldier of Fortune magazine, confirms this observation. N.Y.
Times, supra note 94. For an excellent discussion of private motives and warfare see R.
TUCKER & R. OSGOOD, FORCE, ORDER AND JUSTICE (1967); J. HUIZINGA, HOMO LUDENS
(1950).
98. See generally MOCKLER, supra note 3.
99. See generally Burmester, supra note 3.
100. See generally BURCHETT & ROEBUCK, supra note 3.
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absolute responsiblity for failure to suppress or prevent mercenary
activity by nationals outside of national territory, the United States
and other key Western European governments will in all likelihood
refuse to become parties. This will leave the proposed regime still-
born. On the other hand, if the finished product does not provide for
absolute responsiblity, the convention will do little more than restate
the current international law. Many governments, including the
United States, may still decline to ratify the result, preferring the
flexibility of the status quo to the extended definitions in the current
draft.
The regulation of mercenary involvement in international con-
flict is peripheral at best. The tragedy is that ideology has obscured
fact and resulted in the allocation of scarce resources to a secondary
task which will have little long term effect on State behavior.
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